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Abstract
We introduce financial frictions in the spirit of Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist
(1999) into a standard RBC model and use the heterogeneous-prior framework of
Angeletos, Collard, and Dellas (2018) to accommodate confidence-driven busi-
ness cycle fluctuations. We show that financial frictions strongly amplify the
response to confidence shocks—more strongly than the response to fundamental
shocks. Furthermore, we show that in the presence of financial frictions, pro-
longed episodes of unfounded optimism cause boom-bust cycles in investment
and to a lesser extent in output. In particular, the financial state of the econ-
omy deteriorates severely after the initial boom, which leaves the economy more
vulnerable to adverse shocks.
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1 Introduction
Chuck Prince, the CEO of Citigroup famously observed in July 2007: “[...] As long as the
music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance.” This famous analogy underscores the
widespread opinion that the economy, and in particular financial markets, are affected by
forces similar to “animal spirits”.1 Consider, for instance, the decision of an investor to
invest in the mortgage market. The return on her investment does not only depend on
her own behavior, but also on the current and future decisions of other economic agents.
Since investors do not know what the other investors believe and how they behave, fads
and rumors about the strength of the mortgage market affect the investment decision, ir-
respective of whether or not these fads and rumors are well founded. Moreover, effects of
fads and rumors are particularly strong if investors are leveraged. If an investor believes
that other investors are pulling back from the mortgage market, she believes the return on
investment falls, which also leads to a lower valuation of her investment projects. This drop
in the valuation of the investment project is particularly dire for a leveraged investor since
it reduces the investor’s equity and thus impairs her ability to raise funds for investment.
Hence, a leveraged investor reacts stronger to fads and rumors. This reaction is reinforced
even further when other investors are leveraged as well, since investors believe that other
leveraged investors cut back investment more strongly, putting even more pressure on the
mortgage market. Eventually, the reaction of investors to fads and rumors spill over to the
real, non-financial part of the economy.
In this paper, we study the interaction between financial markets and fads and rumors
from a macroeconomic perspective. In particular, we explore how financial frictions affect
so-called confidence-driven fluctuations—fluctuations driven by aggregate waves of fads and
rumors unrelated to economic fundamentals.2 To this end, we augment a standard RBC
model along two dimensions. First, we introduce financial frictions along the lines of the
widely used financial accelerator framework of Bernanke et al. (1999) (henceforth BGG). In
BGG, entrepreneurs leverage their net worth and undertake risky investment projects. Sec-
ond, we use the heterogeneous-prior framework of Angeletos et al. (2018) (henceforth ACD)
to accommodate a notion of aggregate waves of unfounded fads and rumors, or equivalently,
aggregate waves of unfounded optimism and pessimism.
The paper is related to different strands of the macroeconomic literature on incomplete
information. Our methodology builds upon the literature that introduces forces akin to an-
imal spirits in unique-equilibrium DSGE models. As in Angeletos and La’O (2013), we de-
part from the complete information assumption. This departure allows for non-fundamental
driven fluctuations in a unique equilibrium environment. In Angeletos and La’O (2013),
information frictions prevent agents from forming exactly the same expectations about eco-
nomic activity. Then, non-fundamental shocks—so-called sentiment shocks—can influence
equilibrium expectations and thus economic activity, even in unique-equilibrium rational-
1Here we refer to the interpretation of Keynes (1936), that human behavior can be driven by spontaneous
instincts and emotions.
2By fundamentals we refer to factors that constitute the structure of an economy, including peoples’
abilities and preferences, firms’ know-how, government policies, and any news thereof.
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expectation models.3 More precisely, an adverse sentiment shock rationalizes the pessimism
of an agent by making her receive signals about the pessimism of others. However, in-
troducing dispersed private information into rational-expectations models complicates the
computation of the model solution considerably once dynamic choices are involved. Hence,
ACD develop a heterogeneous-prior framework that accommodates forces akin to animal
spirits in unique-equilibrium DSGE models, while maintaining a tractable environment.
ACD build on the key insight of Angeletos and La’O (2013) that deviations of higher-
order beliefs from first-order beliefs about fundamentals help to accommodate autonomous
variations in equilibrium expectations. Their heterogeneous-prior approach enables them to
engineer deviations of first-order beliefs from higher-order beliefs while bypassing the com-
putational complications that arise from noisy learning and heterogeneity. While ACD use
their framework to study the impact of so-called confidence shocks—the analog of sentiment
shocks in Angeletos and La’O (2013)—in various DSGE models, they do not consider models
with financial frictions, which is our focus.
There are only a few papers in the macroeconomic literature on incomplete information
with a focus on the interaction between financial markets and a notion of animal spirits.
Examples are Angeletos, Lorenzoni, and Pavan (2010), Goldstein, Ozdenoren, and Yuan
(2013) and Benhabib, Liu, and Wang (2016) who study models where information spillovers
lead to a two-way feedback between the financial and the real sector. In Angeletos et al.
(2010), the impact of noise shocks—correlated errors across entrepreneurs’ information about
fundamentals, which can be interpreted as shocks to confidence—on equilibrium outcomes is
strongly amplified. Key for the strong amplification is that information spillovers from the
real to the financial sector generate a strategic complementarity in the investment decision.
Goldstein et al. (2013) focus on information spillovers from the financial sector to the real
sector. Correlated errors in the signals to speculators may give rise to trading frenzies,
i.e. episodes in which many speculators rush to trade in the same direction. Such episodes
lead to a strong pressure on prices. Both contributions focus on static models and can
therefore not investigate the role of correlated errors about fundamentals on the dynamics
of aggregates. Benhabib et al. (2016) analyze a similar set up as Goldstein et al. (2013), but
in addition, they study dynamic effects of sentiment shocks in an overlapping generations
model.
In contrast to Angeletos et al. (2010), Goldstein et al. (2013), and Benhabib et al.
(2016), we do not focus on information spillovers between economic agents. We study the
interaction of confidence and credit market frictions—credit market frictions that make the
availability of outside finance, e.g. debt, relevant. In this regard, our paper is closely related
to La’O (2010) who investigates a model with a Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) style collateral
constraint under dispersed information. In La’O (2010), tighter collateral constraints amplify
the impact of noise shocks strongly, whereas the impact of fundamental shocks is muted.
Key to this result is that agents over-weight public information when they try to infer
aggregate activity (similar to Morris and Shin, 2002). A positive noise shock that is common
knowledge leads agents to believe aggregate activity increases strongly. The demand for
3In a similar framework, Benhabib, Wang, and Wen (2015) also show that information frictions give rise
to fluctuations, which are unrelated to changes in the economy’s fundamentals. But in contrast to Angeletos
and La’O (2013), confidence can lead to multiple equilibria in their model.
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collateral increases and pushes up the collateral’s value, which relaxes the credit constraint
and enables a strong expansion of production. The contribution of La’O (2010) offers some
insights regarding the amplification of a similar notion of confidence shocks; however, in a
static set-up. In contrast, our model is a dynamic business cycle model and allows us to
study the dynamic aspects of confidence-driven fluctuations as well.
Our paper also relates to the literature on sunspots (see, e.g., Woodford, 1986; Barinci
and Chéron, 2001; Bosi, Magris, and Venditti, 2007; Liu and Wang, 2014). In this literature,
financial frictions give rise to multiple equilibria and allow for non-fundamental sources of
fluctuations, so-called sunspots. Sunspot shocks serve as a device for agents to coordinate on
a specific equilibrium. They are also viewed as a possible theoretical justification of Keynes’
animal spirits allegory about economic instability. Adverse realizations of sunspot shocks
cause agents to coordinate on welfare-inferior equilibria. Such coordination failures can then
be interpreted as some form of pessimism. In contrast, our formalization of confidence does
not rely on the existence of multiple equilibria.
Our model economy consists of multiple islands. Each island is inhabited by a basic
RBC economy with a financial market structure as in BGG. On each island, agents interact
in competitive markets and produce a specialized local good. Islands are connected with
each other through a centralized market on a mainland where the specialized goods and a
final good are traded. The specialized goods are complements in the production of the final
good, which takes place on the mainland. The final good is then used for consumption and
investment. Importantly, the employment decision on the local island takes place before
aggregate production and the agents’ real income streams are observed. Following ACD,
there is no communication between islands, which impedes islands from reaching common
beliefs about aggregate production. Each agent receives a signal about the economy’s fun-
damentals before trade between islands takes place. All agents on an island receive the same
signal, which they know is unbiased. However, agents believe the signals of the agents on
the other islands to be biased by an exogenous variable ξt. Following ACD, we engineer
waves of optimism and pessimism through the variable ξt, the confidence shock.
The basic mechanism of a confidence shock works as follows. A positive innovation in
confidence induces agents to believe that the agents on all other islands believe in, say, a
technological improvement.4 Since a positive technology shock leads to higher labor input,
agents believe that the production of all other islands will increase. The complementarity in
the final good production translates these beliefs to beliefs about improved terms of trade
for the domestic island. In turn, beliefs about improved terms of trade stimulate labor
input and lead to an effective increase in the domestic island’s production. Hence, due to
the strategic complementarity in islands’ production choices, a confidence shock leads to an
increase in production. Because all islands are hit by the same confidence shock, production
increases on all islands.
Our main result is that financial frictions amplify the response of economic activity to
confidence shocks strongly, more strongly than to other fundamental shocks which are usually
4Following ACD, in our baseline specification, the confidence shock affects beliefs about technology. We
address confidence shocks that affect beliefs about other fundamentals in 4.3.
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considered in the literature.5 The strong amplification occurs mainly because financial
frictions strengthen the strategic complementarity between the production choices of islands.
Financial frictions of BGG strengthen the strategic complementarity as follows: The friction
introduces a risk premium on the expected return on capital. This risk premium is inversely
related to the net worth of entrepreneurs, as a higher level of net worth mitigates agency
problems. An increase in the production on all other islands leads to a domestic improvement
in terms of trade and raises the level of net worth of entrepreneurs on the domestic island. A
higher level of net worth reduces the risk premium, which has a similar effect as a reduction in
an investment tax and hence leads to higher production. Thus, if agents on an island believe
that production on all other islands will increase, the production of the agents’ own island
rises more strongly because of this financial accelerator. In contrast, the strengthening of
strategic complementarity stemming from financial frictions does not affect the response to
fundamental shocks. As is common to all complete information rational expectation models,
the true value of the current fundamentals is common knowledge. Therefore, agents know
that agents on every island behave alike in face of a fundamental shock and that no beliefs
about improved terms of trade emerge in equilibrium. It is as if only one island exists.
Another interesting finding concerns the propagation of confidence shocks in the presence
of financial frictions. With financial frictions, a positive innovation in confidence leads to a
boom-bust pattern in investment, which is followed by a slow recovery in investment in the
aftermath of the bust. The boom-bust pattern in investment also translates to a lesser extent
to the response of output. Without financial frictions, no boom-bust cycle in investment
emerges. The significant difference in the propagation of confidence shocks is related to
the entrepreneurs’ borrowing decisions. When confidence is persistent, an innovation in
confidence leads agents to persistently overestimate the return on investment. Based on
these erroneous beliefs, an entrepreneur wants to borrow more and is willing to pay higher
interest payments than she would if she knew the realized aggregate return on investment of
the next period. The, from an ex-post perspective, too high interest payments and higher
default rates have a negative effect on the entrepreneur’s net worth. As the confidence shock
is persistent, the over-borrowing of entrepreneurs continues and net worth eventually falls
below its long-run trend. Even after unfounded optimism has vanished, the level of net worth
remains low and recovers only slowly. The low level of net worth depresses investment, and
thus real activity for a long time after confidence has vanished.
The existence and extent of the boom-bust cycle depend on the persistence of confidence.
The more persistent a confidence shock, the longer and stronger entrepreneurs overestimate
the return on investment. Consequently, entrepreneurs borrow too heavily against their net
worth for a longer time and hence the fall of entrepreneur net worth is larger and longer-
lasting.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model.
Section 3 describes the equilibrium characterization and the solution method. In Section
4, we investigate the effect of financial frictions on the propagation of confidence shocks
within a calibrated version of our model. In Section 5, we apply our model to the US Great
5As standard fundamental shocks we consider TFP, news, government expenditure, discount factor and
(persistent) investment-specific shocks.
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Recession. We conduct counterfactual exercises to determine the role that the interaction of
confidence and financial frictions played during the Great Recession. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
In this section, we present our model economy. First, we describe the physical environment
of the economy and the timing of the events. Second, we characterize the non-financial
part of the economy. Third, we describe the financial sector and detail the agency problems
associated with financial intermediation. Finally, we describe the shocks and the structure
of beliefs.
Geography and timing. There is a continuum of islands indexed by i and a mainland.
Each island is populated by a continuum of identical households, firms, capital producers
and entrepreneurs that interact on perfectly competitive local markets for labor, capital,
and credit. Islands are identical except for the specialized good the local firms produce.
These specialized local goods are shipped to the mainland to produce a final good. This
final good is then sold on a competitive market and is used for consumption and investment
on the islands.
Figure 1 illustrates when the different markets operate within a period. Each period is
divided into two stages. In the first stage, firms hire labor from households and rent capital
from entrepreneurs. These choices take place under commitment. There is no communica-
tion across islands and therefore the employment and capital rental decision are made in
anticipation of aggregate economic activity within the same period. In the second stage,
mainland markets operate and aggregate economic activity is revealed. Households con-
sume the final good and deposit savings in banks. Capital producers combine the final
good and old depreciated capital bought from entrepreneurs in order to build new capital.
Entrepreneurs repay previous loans and ask for a new loan from banks to buy new capital
from capital producers which they rent to local firms in the next period, t+ 1.
The timing of events and the incomplete information between islands reflects the fact
that, in reality, firms cannot communicate with all potential customers before making their
employment and capital rental decisions. Hence, incomplete information allows for devia-
tions in the beliefs about economic activity across agents. This opens the door for fluctu-
Figure 1: Timeline: first and second stage
t t+ 1
First stage Second stage
Incomplete information
about actions on other islands
Complete information
- Local capital rental markets operate
- Local labor markets operate
- Local and final goods markets operate
- Financial markets operate
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ations in aggregates that may be driven by some form of optimism or pessimism that is
unrelated to fundamentals.
We now turn to the problems faced by individual agents on an arbitrary island i. In
what follows, we use the expectation operator Eit to denote agents’ expectations formed in
the first stage of period t, while E′it refers to expectations formed in the second stage of
period t. Without loss of generality, we normalize the prize of the final good Pt = 1.
Households. The representative household maximizes lifetime utility over consumption
and leisure. Preferences are represented by
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
log cit −
h1+νit
1 + ν
)
, (1)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, cit is consumption, hit are hours worked, and ν is
the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. The household maximizes (1) subject to
a sequence of budget constraints
cit + b
h
i,t+1 = withit +Ri,t−1b
h
it + Ωit, t ≥ 0.
The household earns a predetermined safe interest rate Ri,t−1 on her deposits bhit and a
wage wit for supplying labor. The variable Ωit summarizes firm profits that are transferred
to the household and transfers between the household and entrepreneurs. The household’s
optimality conditions are
hνit = Eit
[
1
cit
]
wit, (2)
1
cit
= βRitE
′
it
[
1
cit+1
]
. (3)
The first optimality condition (2) is the usual labor supply equation, but augmented with an
expectation operator in consumption. When hours are chosen in the first stage, agents form
expectations about consumption which is determined in the second stage. The expectation
operator E′it in the Euler equation (3) reflects that households choose consumption in the
second stage only.
Local firms. The representative local firm chooses labor hit and capital kit to maximize
profits πit
πit = pityit − withit − rkitkit,
where yit denotes the local specialized good and pit its price. Firms produce with the
Cobb-Douglas technology
yit = Atk
α
it(hit)
1−α,
where At is aggregate total-factor productivity (TFP). The first order conditions are
wit = (1− α)
Eit [pityit]
hit
, (4)
rkit = α
Eit [pityit]
kit
. (5)
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Conditions (4) and (5) are the firm’s optimal labor and capital demand decisions. Both are
determined in the first stage.
Capital producers. A representative local capital producer operates in the second
stage. He buys the final good and depreciated left-over capital from the entrepreneurs,
which he combines to produce capital for the next period (kit+1). He maximizes profits πcit
πcit = q̄itkit+1 − qitkit(1− δ)− iit,
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the depreciation rate, q̄it is the price of new capital, qit the price of
left over old capital and iit is the final good the capital producer buys as investment. New
capital goods are produced according to the technology
kit+1 = (1− δ)kit + iit
(
1− Φ
(
iit
kit
))
,
where Φ
(
iit
kit
)
captures capital adjustment costs. The presence of capital adjustment costs
leads to a varying price of capital. The optimal investment decision is given by
1
q̄it
= 1− Φ
(
iit
kit
)
− Φ′
(
iit
kit
)
iit
kit
.
Perfect competition among capital producers leads to zero profits and thus
q̄it =
qit(1− δ) + iitkit
(1− δ) + iitkit
(
1− Φ
(
iit
kit
)) . (6)
Since the capital producer is only active in the second stage and only faces a static opti-
mization problem, he operates under complete information about the actions of others. The
inclusion of capital producers is a modeling device that forces entrepreneurs to (re)purchase
the entire capital stock in each period, as in BGG. The repurchase of the entire capital stock
ensures that leverage restrictions or other financial constraints apply not only to marginal
investment, but to the entire stock of capital, i.e. to the entrepreneur as a whole. Further-
more, the presence of capital producers ensures that capital adjustment costs are external
for entrepreneurs, so that entrepreneurs take the price of capital as given.
Final good sector. A representative final good firm produces a final good Yt using
local goods yit as inputs. The good is produced with a Cobb-Douglas technology which
encompasses strategic complementarity: logYt =
∫ 1
0
logyitdi. The final good firm’s problem
is
max
yit
Yt −
∫ 1
0
pityitdi.
Optimal behavior of agents leads to a demand function that satisfies
pityit = Yt. (7)
Entrepreneurs and banks. The modeling of entrepreneurs follows BGG and Chris-
tiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2003). On each island, there is a continuum of entrepreneurs
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Figure 2: One period in the life of an entrepreneur
Period t Period t+ 1
First stage Second stage
*Purchases new capital
from capital producers
with net worth Nit+1
and loans. Raw capital
is hit with idiosyncratic
shock ω.
After the realization
of aggregate shocks,
rents capital to local
firms.
Sells undepreci-
ated capital to
capital produc-
ers.
Pays back the
loan to the bank
(if she can).
Receives transfer
weit+1 from house-
holds if she sur-
vives. Also if she is
born in t+ 1.
Net worth Nit+2 of
entrepreneur is de-
termined. Continue
with *.
of size one which are risk-neutral. The entrepreneurs face a constant probability of death
(1−γ) in each period. Further, (1−γ) new entrepreneurs are born in each period, such that
the population of entrepreneurs stays constant. Having a finite horizon for entrepreneurs
ensures that entrepreneurs never accumulate enough net worth to be fully self-financing.
Surviving and newly born entrepreneurs receive a transfer weit from households, which en-
sures that bankrupt and newly born entrepreneurs have non-zero wealth and can buy new
capital. Surviving entrepreneurs do not consume anything: their objective is to maximize
their expected end-of-life consumption. Dying entrepreneurs consume a fraction Θ of their
equity (i.e. accumulated wealth) and transfer a fraction (1 − Θ) to the households. In or-
der to abstract from the distinction between household and entrepreneurial consumption on
aggregate, we follow Christiano et al. (2003) and let Θ go to zero.
In order to detail the relationship of entrepreneurs with the non-financial and financial
business sector, we consider one period in the life of an arbitrary entrepreneur j on island i.
We start at the end of period t, after production on the mainland and transfers from and to
households have taken place (see Figure 2). At this time, the state of the entrepreneur is fully
summarized by her level of net worth N jit+1. The density of entrepreneurs with net worth
N jit+1 is denoted by ft(N
j
it+1), and aggregate net worth by Nit+1 =
∫
N jit+1fit(Nit+1)dN
j
it+1.
For better readability, we refer to an entrepreneur with net worth N jit+1 as an N
j-type
entrepreneur. Each N j-type obtains a loan bN
j
it+1 from a bank, and together with her net
worth the entrepreneur buys new end of period raw capital kN
j
it+1 to be used in period t+ 1
at the market price q̄it from the capital producers
q̄itk
Nj
it+1 = N
j
it+1 + b
Nj
it+1.
After the purchase of raw capital, the entrepreneur is hit by an idiosyncratic shock ω which
turns her raw capital into effective units of capital ωkN
j
it+1. The shock reflects idiosyncratic
risk in actual business ventures and is drawn independently by entrepreneurs and indepen-
dently across time. The random variable ω ≥ 0 has mean one and follows a log-normal
distribution. The cross-sectional standard deviation of log(ω) is σω,t. In the following pe-
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riod t+ 1, in the first stage, the entrepreneur rents her effective capital ωkN
j
it+1 at rate rkit+1
to the local firm. Together, the N j types supply kN
j
it+1 since the random variable ω has
mean one and all N j-type entrepreneurs buy the same level of capital at the end of period
t. In the second stage in t + 1, after the production of the local good, entrepreneurs sell
left-over capital (1−δ)ωkit+1 at price qit+1 to the capital producer. Thus, the return for the
entrepreneur is ωRkit+1, where Rkit+1 is the aggregate return on capital in the island economy
Rkit+1 =
rkit+1 + qit+1(1− δ)
q̄it
.
The loan contract which N j-type entrepreneurs choose in period t takes the form of
a state-contingent standard debt contract specified by the gross borrowing rate zN
j
it+1 and
the leverage lN
j
it = q̄itk
Nj
it+1/N
j
it+1. The repayment rate z
Nj
it+1 is contingent on the realized
state of the economy in period t+ 1. Depending on the realization of the idiosyncratic risk
shock ω, an N j-type entrepreneur may or may not be able to repay the loan. The threshold
realization for ω, below which N j-type entrepreneurs cannot repay the loan, is defined by
ω̄N
j
it+1. The threshold is given by
ω̄N
j
it+1R
k
it+1q̄itk
Nj
it+1 = b
Nj
it+1z
Nj
it+1 (8)
and depends on the realized state of the economy in period t + 1. Given the definition of
the threshold, the standard debt contract can equivalently be expressed by (ω̄N
j
it+1, l
Nj
it ). An
entrepreneur who cannot repay the loan declares bankruptcy. The bank undertakes costly
monitoring of the entrepreneur and confiscates her assets.
Entrepreneurs maximize the next period’s expected net worth:6
E′it
[
Λit,t+1
∫ ∞
ω̄N
j
t+1
[
ωRkit+1q̄itk
Nj
it+1 − bN
j
it+1z
Nj
it+1
]
ft(ω)dω
]
=E′it
[
Λit,t+1
[
1− Γt(ω̄N
j
it+1)
]
Rkit+1l
Nj
it N
j
it+1
]
, (9)
where Γt(ω̄it+1) ≡ [1 − Ft(ω̄it+1)]ω̄it+1 + Gt(ω̄it+1), Gt ≡
∫ ω̄it+1
0
ωft(ω)dω and Λit,t+1 =
βu′(cit+1)/u
′(cit) is the stochastic discount factor. To obtain the right-hand side (RHS)
of equation (9), we replace the gross interest payment using (8). The RHS of equation
(9) states that the expected next period’s net worth of an N j-type corresponds to the
expectation about the share 1 − Γt(ω̄N
j
it+1) of entrepreneurial earnings Rkit+1q̄itkN
j
it+1 that
the N j-type entrepreneur receives. As shown by BGG, Γ(·) is strictly increasing. Thus, the
return is strictly decreasing in ω̄it+1 for a given return spread Rkit+1/Rit and a given leverage
level.
We now describe the banking sector and the contracts banks offer. Without loss of
generality, one can think of banks as specializing to lend only to entrepreneurs with the
same level of net worth. That is, for each level of entrepreneurial net worth N j , there exists
a large number of N j-type banks. Each N j-type bank holds a perfectly diversified portfolio
of loans to N j-type entrepreneurs. At the end of period t, after the production of the final
6This follows BGG. Dmitriev and Hoddenbagh (2017) show that, in a first-order approximation, it
does not matter whether entrepreneurs maximize the expected end-of-life consumption or the next period’s
expected net worth.
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good has taken place, the N j-type bank receives savings bN
j
it+1 from households for which
it promises a safe gross nominal rate Rit. The savings are then lent to entrepreneurs. To
ensure that the bank is able to pay back the safe rate in t + 1 in each possible state of
the economy, banks offer a schedule of state-contingent contracts. The bank’s participation
constraint ensures that in each state in period t+ 1, the funds received from entrepreneurs
are at least as large as the funds that have to be paid to the households:
[1− Ft(ω̄N
j
it+1)]z
Nj
it+1b
Nj
it+1 + (1− µ)
∫ ω̄Njit+1
0
ωft(ω)R
k
it+1q̄itk
Nj
it+1 ≥ bN
j
it+1Rit. (10)
The first term on the left-hand side denotes the payments from the non-defaulting portion of
the entrepreneurs. The second term is what the bank can seize from defaulting entrepreneurs,
net of a monitoring cost. The monitoring cost is proportional to the assets seized, i.e. a
fraction µ of the assets.
Because there is a large number of N j-type banks and they are perfectly competitive,
they make zero profits and equation (10) holds with equality. Using the definition of the
threshold ω̄N
j
it+1, the break-even constraint of the banks is
Γt(ω̄
Nj
it+1)− µGt(ω̄N
j
it+1) =
lN
j
it − 1
lN
j
it
Rit
Rkit+1
. (11)
Condition (11) implies that for a chosen leverage by the entrepreneurs, the threshold ω̄N
j
it+1
is contingent on the state and the realization of Rkit+1. This zero profit condition therefore
defines the set of standard debt contracts (ω̄N
j
it+1, l
Nj
it ) offered by the banks. The entrepreneur
maximizes her expected return (9) subject to the zero profit condition (11), i.e. knowing
that ω̄N
j
it+1 will depend on the ex-post realization of Rkit+1. The entrepreneur takes as given
the distribution of aggregate and idiosyncratic risk to the return on capital, the stochastic
discount factor, the price of capital and the quantity of net worth that she has as collateral.
The first-order condition is:7
E′it
Ajt
 1− Γt(ω̄Njit+1)
1− R
k
it+1
Rit
(
Γt(ω̄N
j
it+1)− µGt(ω̄N
j
it+1)
)×
Rkit+1
Rit
(
1− Ft(ω̄N
j
it+1)− µω̄N
j
it+1F
′
t (ω̄
Nj
it+1)
)]}
= E′it
{
Ajt
[
1− Ft(ω̄N
j
it+1)
]}
,
with Ajt ≡
Λit,t+1R
k
it+1
1− R
k
it+1
Rit
(
Γt(ω̄N
j
it+1)− µGt(ω̄N
j
it+1)
) . (12)
As the safe rate and the return Rkit+1 are independent of the N j-type, entrepreneurs choose
the same (ω̄N
j
it+1, l
Nj
it ) contract, i.e. (ω̄N
j
it+1, l
Nj
it ) = (ω̄it+1, lit) ∀N j , independent of their net
worth.
Aggregation and market clearing of the final good. In equilibrium, the total
amount of produced raw capital kit+1 must equal the total amount of raw capital kit+1
7Since Njit+1 is already known and taken as given, it can be taken outside of the expectation operator
and therefore drops from the entrepreneur’s optimality condition. Note that in the linearized solution, Ajt
drops from the entrepreneur’s optimality condition.
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purchased by entrepreneurs in period t
kit+1 =
∫ ∞
0
kN
j
it+1fit(N
j
it+1)dN
j
it+1. (13)
Likewise, the aggregate supply of effective capital by entrepreneurs in period t must equal
the aggregate demand for capital services by firms
kit =
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
ωkN
j
it ft−1(ω)dωfit−1(N
j
it)dN
j
it =
∫ ∞
0
kN
j
it fit−1(N
j
it)dN
j
it, (14)
where the second-last equality uses the fact that the mean of ω is unity.
Using the law of large numbers, we obtain the average profits of an N j-type entrepreneur
in period t+ 1∫ ∞
0
max
{
0, ωft(ω)R
k
it+1q̄itk
Nj
it+1
}
dω = [1− Γt(ω̄it+1)]Rkit+1q̄itkN
j
it+1. (15)
Hence, aggregate profits of all entrepreneurs in period t+1 are [1− Γt(ω̄it+1)]Rkit+1q̄itkit+1.
At the end of the period, only a fraction γ of entrepreneurs survives. The newborn and
surviving entrepreneurs then receive a transfer weit from households. Overall, aggregate net
worth on island i evolves according to
nit+1 = γ[1− Γt−1(ω̄it)]Rkitq̄it−1kit + weit. (16)
The final good is used for consumption, investment and monitoring costs. Therefore the
market clearing condition is
Yt = cit + iit + µGt−1(ω̄it)R
k
itq̄it−1kit. (17)
TFP shock. The TFP shock impacts At and follows a random walk process
log(At) = log(At−1) + εa,t, εa,t ∼ N (0, σa).
Confidence shock and higher-order beliefs. To introduce confidence-driven fluctu-
ations, we adopt the heterogeneous-prior framework of ACD. First, we remove the common-
knowledge assumption of At to allow for fluctuations driven by non-fundamentals. Each
island observes an island-specific signal xit about aggregate TFP at ≡ logAt:
xit = at + εit.
Second, we depart from the common-prior assumption. Agents on each island think that the
signal on their own island is unbiased, i.e. εit ∼ N (0, σ2). However, all agents believe the
other islands’ signal is biased by a common stationary exogenous random variable ξt—the
confidence shock—and believe the error εjt follows N (ξt, σ2),∀j 6= i. The priors and ξt are
common knowledge. Agents agree to disagree. Intuitively, a positive innovation in ξt affects
an agent’s behavior by making him believe that the agents on all other islands believe
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in a technological improvement. However, agents know that no change in the economic
fundamentals has taken place. The confidence shock follows an AR(1) process
ξt = ρξξt−1 + ζt,
where ζt ∼ N (0, σ2ζ ) and ρζ ∈ (0, 1).
Following ACD, we focus on the limit case where σ → 0 to abstract from noisy learning
and heterogeneity. That is, all islands receive the true signal about TFP At. From a
technical viewpoint, ξt introduces deviations of higher-order beliefs from first-order beliefs
about TFP. It is exactly this gap in beliefs which underlies the confidence driven fluctuations
in incomplete information unique-equilibrium rational expectations environments such as
Angeletos and La’O (2013) and Huo and Takayama (2015).
3 Equilibrium characterization and solution method
This section characterizes the equilibrium and describes the solution method.
3.1 Equilibrium characterization
In the absence of confidence shocks, the equilibrium characterization of our model is the
same as in any other standard complete information rational expectations model. Agents
already know in the first stage that all islands behave the same in equilibrium, i.e. they
know yit = yjt ∀i, j and pit = 1(= Pt). In the presence of confidence shocks (ξ 6= 0), agents
believe in the first stage that yit 6= yjt and that terms of trade pit(= pitPt ) behave according
to pityit = Yt. The equilibrium in our model can be characterized as below. Since all islands
are identical in equilibrium, we drop the subscript i.
A general equilibrium in our model is a sequence of first-stage quantities L1 = {Ht,Kt}∞t=0,
a sequence of second-stage quantities L2 = {Kt+1, Nt+1, Bt+1, Ct, It, Yt, ωt}∞t=0, a sequence
of first-stage beliefs about aggregate production B = {Et[Yt]}∞t=0, and sequences of first-stage
prices P1 = {Rkt ,Wt}∞t=0 and second-stage prices P2 = {Rt, Qt, Q̄t, Rkt , Zt}∞t=0 such that
(1) Given a sequence of first-stage prices P1 and of first-stage beliefs about aggregate
demand B, the sequence of first-stage quantities L1 solves the first-stage problem of
the household, the firm and the entrepreneur.
(2) Given a sequence of first-stage quantities L1 and given first-stage beliefs about aggre-
gate demand B, the sequence of first-stage prices P1 clears the first-stage markets.
(3) Given a sequence of first-stage quantities L1 and a sequence of second-stage prices
P2, the sequence of second-stage quantities L2 solves the second-stage problem of the
household, the firm, the entrepreneur, the bank and the capital producer.
(4) Given a sequence of second-stage quantities L2, the sequence of second-stage prices P2
clears all second-stage markets.
(5) The sequence of first-stage beliefs about aggregate production B is consistent with
the heterogenous-prior belief formulation and the sequence of second-stage production
choices.
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(6) The perceived law of motion of the exogenous states of the economy coincides with
the objective law of motion of the exogenous states.
(7) The second-stage perception of the next period’s level of endogenous states coincides
with their actual level of endogenous states.
The differences to the standard complete information rational expectation model lie in con-
ditions (5)–(7). In complete information models, not only the perceived law of motion of
exogenous states but also the perceived law of motion of endogenous states coincides with
the objective law of motion of the states. That is, condition (6) holds for endogenous states,
too. In the presence of confidence, only in the second stage the perceived level of the en-
dogenous states net worth and capital in the next period (Nt+1, Kt+1) coincides with the
objective level. In the first stage, the perceived level of net worth and capital in the next
period is subject to a bias.
Further, confidence introduces a gap between beliefs about aggregate production and
actual production outcomes (condition 5). In complete information models, no heterogenous-
prior can exist. Hence, first-stage beliefs about aggregate production coincide with second-
stage production and condition (5) becomes trivial.
3.2 Solution method
We log-linearize the equilibrium equations around the deterministic steady state (see Ap-
pendix Section A.1). To solve for the linearized equilibrium of our incomplete information
heterogenous-prior model, we apply the solution method developed by ACD. Generally, in
standard complete information rational expectations DSGE models, the linearized equilib-
rium dynamics can be written as
(Yt, X
b
t+1) = ΓXX
b
t + ΓZZt.
The policy functions for vectors Yt and Xbt+1 can be expressed as linear functions of the
backward-looking state vector Xbt and a vector of shocks Zt. The heterogenous-prior frame-
work departs from the rational expectations solution concept by introducing a systematic
bias in the beliefs which agents form about the equilibrium impact of ξt on macroeconomic
outcomes.8 The linearized equilibrium dynamics obtained from the ACD solution method
then is
(Yt, X
b
t+1) = ΓXX
b
t + ΓZZt + Γξξt,
where the matrices ΓX and ΓZ are the same as those in the standard complete information
rational expectation DSGE model. Even though the heterogenous-prior set-up relaxes some
restrictions of the common-prior rational expectation setting, the deviations due to the
confidence shock ξ are not free of restrictions. The information structure of the model
connects the beliefs about the endogenous objects with each other. Fluctuations due to
ξ are disciplined by cross-equation restrictions, which is reflected by the fact that Γξ is
obtained by solving an equation which contains ΓX and ΓZ .9
8ACD emphasize that in common-prior settings under rational expectations, similar waves in higher-order
beliefs can be obtained without introducing a systematic bias in beliefs. The “bias” in the heterogenous-prior
approach corresponds to “rational confusion” in common-prior settings.
9Details about the solution algorithm can be found in ACD.
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4 Quantitative analysis
In this section, we explore the interaction between financial markets and aggregate waves of
optimism and pessimism. More specifically, we analyze how financial frictions influence the
propagation of confidence shocks in a calibrated version of our model.
4.1 Calibration
The parameter values of our baseline calibration are summarized in Table 1. The parameters
of the non-financial block are set as follows: The discount factor β is set such that the steady
state annual risk-free return is 3%. The capital share α is set to 0.3 and the depreciation
rate of capital δ is set to 0.012. The inverse Frisch elasticity ν is set to 0.15 to ensure
that the relative volatility between total hours and output is similar to the US between
1962Q1–2015Q1.10 With regard to the capital adjustment costs Φ
(
xit
kit
)
, we follow BGG.
We define Φ(δ) = Φ′(δ) = 0,Φ(δ)δ2 = φ > 0, and set the capital adjustment cost parameter
φ (elasticity of the capital price with respect to the investment capital ratio) to 0.2.11
Turning to the parameters of the financial block, the idiosyncratic productivity shock ωt+1 to
entrepreneurs in the end of period t follows a log-normal distribution with standard deviation
σω and mean −0.5σ2ω (so that Eω = 1). Following Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2014)
(henceforth CMR), we set the standard deviation σω to 0.26. Similarly to BGG and CMR,
the monitoring costs, the fraction of net worth transferred to households as well as the
transfer from households to entrepreneurs are chosen to match a steady state leverage ratio
of 2, an annual bankruptcy rate of 2.3% and an annualized return spread of 2.8% points.
This calibration strategy implies monitoring costs of 0.20, a transfer rate of 3% of the net
worth of entrepreneurs to households and a transfer rate of households to entrepreneurs of
5.73% of total output.
Technology follows a random walk and the confidence shock follows an AR(1) process.
The auto-regressive parameter for the confidence shock ρξ is set to 0.6. The standard
deviations of the shock processes are calibrated by minimizing the distance between the
model-implied standard deviations of GDP, consumption, investment and hours and those
of the data. Table 7 in the Appendix Section A.3 reports business cycle moments implied by
our calibrated model and the moments of the observed data.12 Overall, our model appears
well suited for business cycle analysis. The model is able to replicate the volatility of
the non-financial aggregates and the correlations between both non-financial and financial
aggregates remarkably well. An important shortcoming of our model is that it does not
generate sufficient volatility in credit, net worth and the interest spread. Given our focus
on the role that the interaction between confidence and financial frictions plays on the real,
non-financial part of the economy, no further steps are undertaken to raise these volatilities.
10For details about the data, see Appendix Section A.2. The value of the Frisch elasticity is rather high
because capital adjustment cost dampen the response of labor considerably.
11BGG consider a range between 0 and 0.5 as meaningful. Recent empirical studies by Hall (2004) and
Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) are in line with that range.
12We describe the data in more detail in Appendix Section A.2. To obtain the model-implied moments,
we simulate our model and apply a band-pass filter (Christiano and Fitzgerald, 2003) to consider only
frequencies between 6 and 32 quarters. For a discussion of the size of the standard deviations, see Appendix
Section A.4.
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Table 1: Calibration
Parameter Role Value
Non-financial block
β Discount rate 1.03−
1
4
ν Inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply 0.15
α Capital share in production 0.3
δ Depreciation rate 0.012
φ Capital adjustment costs 0.2
Financial block
µ Monitoring costs 0.20
µω Mean of log ω −0.5σ2ω
σω Standard deviation of log ω 0.26
(1− γ) Death rate of entrepreneurs 0.03
we/Y Household transfer to entrepreneurs 0.0573
Shock processes: technology shock (a) and confidence shock (ξ)
ρa Persistence of a 1
ρξ Persistence of ξ 0.60
σa Standard deviation of a 0.70
σξ Standard deviation of ξ 10.08
Shutting down the financial accelerator. Given our interest in the interaction of
financial frictions with confidence, we consider a version of our model without financial fric-
tions, where µ = 0. Financial frictions introduce a wedge between the expected return on
capital and the rate at which households can save. This wedge distorts the consumption-
savings decision of households. Without monitoring costs (µ = 0), the agency problem
between lenders and borrowers disappears and the wedge vanishes in a first-order approxi-
mation (E′it[R̂kit+1] = R̂it). Therefore, with µ = 0, the equilibrium outcome of our linearized
model is the same as the one of the underlying RBC model without banks and entrepreneurs.
The financial accelerator becomes a sideshow in equilibrium. In other words, in equilibrium,
the non-financial part of the economy is independent of financial market aggregates such as
the leverage level, the level of net worth and the interest spread.
For the model specification without financial frictions, we use the same parameter values
described in Table 1 but set µ to zero—which implies a return spread of 0% points—and
adjust the household’s transfer to entrepreneurs we to 17.57% of output. The change in we
ensures that the steady state leverage ratio and the bankruptcy rate remains the same.
4.2 Financial frictions and the propagation of confidence shocks
We now turn to the discussion of our two main results, illustrated by Figure 3. The figure
depicts the responses of non-financial aggregates to a one-standard-deviation confidence
shock in the baseline model (µ = 0.20) and in the absence of financial frictions (µ = 0).
The responses are measured in percentage deviations to the steady state. First, in 4.2.1,
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Figure 3: IRFs of non-financial aggregates to a confidence shock
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we discuss the strong amplification effect of financial frictions on confidence shocks. In
the presence of financial frictions, output, consumption, hours and investment react much
stronger to a confidence shock on impact. Second, in 4.2.2, we explore how financial frictions
lead to a boom-bust pattern in investment in the sense that the response of investment
eventually falls below its steady state after a few quarters. The responses of hours and output
exhibit a similar pattern, however, the fall below their steady states is not as pronounced.
4.2.1 Amplification effect
Financial frictions strongly amplify the responses to confidence shocks. On impact, financial
frictions raise the response of output and hours from 0.51 to 0.83 percent and from 0.72 to
1.19 percent above steady state—this change in the responses corresponds to an amplifi-
cation effect of more than 64 percent. The response of investment is amplified even more:
The response on impact more than doubles from 1.37 to 3.56 percent. These numbers are
large compared to other fundamental shocks. The flexible-price version of the BGG model,
which we adopt, is known to amplify responses to non-financial fundamental shocks only
weakly (see, e.g., Dmitriev and Hoddenbagh, 2017). Table 2 reports the amplification effect
of financial frictions on the impact response of output to other fundamental shocks. For
the technology shock, for example, the amplification effect of financial frictions on output is
only 5.6%. For all fundamental shocks, the amplification effect of financial frictions is much
weaker compared to the confidence shock.13
Table 2: Amplification effect on output (on impact)
Confidence Technology Discount Investment-specific News
64% 5.7% 6.5% -29% -11%
Note: News shocks are shocks to TFP that are anticipated one year in advance.
Technology and investment-specific technology shocks follow random walks.
The discount factor shock is modeled as an AR(1) process. The persistence is
chosen to maximize the amplification effect and leads to ρdisc = 0.
13We do not assess the amplification effect on the response to financial shocks because, in the absence of
financial frictions, financial shocks have no influence on output.
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The strong amplification is caused by the strengthening of the strategic complementarity
between the islands’ production choices. This strengthening is best illustrated with a beauty
contest interpretation. As we will show below, the equilibrium impact response of output
can be represented in a way that resembles a static beauty contest.
An illustrative example: beauty contest. For illustrative purposes, the following
presents a static beauty contest model that is derived from a static model similar to our
baseline model. This static model features similar financial frictions and the same multiple
island structure as our baseline model. We also consider the same heterogeneous-prior
framework as in our baseline model, i.e. the same information and shock structure. Details
can be found in Appendix Section A.5.1. Each island of this model can be represented by a
local fictitious planner that chooses production on his local island. The optimal production
choice of an island i is given by the following linear decision rule:
ŷit = κEit[Ât] + χEit[p̂it − P̂t]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Eit[Ŷt−ŷit]
, κ > 0, χ > 0, (18)
where the hat symbol denotes log-deviations from the steady state of the corresponding
variable. The coefficient κmeasures the strength of island i’s output response to a technology
shock Ât for given expectations about terms of trade (Eit[p̂it − P̂t]). The coefficient χ
measures the production response of an island to expectations about terms of trade for a
given level of technology. Because the terms of trade (ToTi) are equivalent to the difference
between aggregate and island specific production (Eit[Ŷt−ŷit]), the model can be represented
as a static beauty contest. Hence, χ can be interpreted as a measure of the strategic
complementarity between the production choices of islands.14
Proposition 1. The solution to the beauty contest defined in equation (18) is given by
ŷit = κÂt + κχξ̂t.
Proof: See Appendix Section A.5.2.
The response of production to a technology shock Ât is determined completely by κ.
Additionally, κ also affects the strength of the response to a confidence shock. The intuition
behind this result is shown in Figure 4. A positive innovation in ξt induces island i to believe
that all other islands believe in a technological improvement (Figure 4a). Hence, island i
believes that all other islands j 6= i increase production yj . The size of the increase in
the production of all other islands depends on κ because κ determines the strength of the
production response to a technological improvement. The stronger the increase of the other
islands’ production and hence aggregate production (Y ), the stronger is the improvement
in terms of trade of island i, and the more strongly island i raises output (Figure 4b). In
turn, the strength with which island i reacts to beliefs about an improvement in terms of
trade is determined by χ. Therefore, how strongly production yi of an island i reacts to a
confidence shock depends on both κ, the response to a technology shock, and χ, the response
to a change in expected terms of trade.
14For convenience, we define the beauty contest slightly different than is usually the case. Usually, the
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Figure 4: Mechanism of a confidence shock
(a) Beliefs about response of other islands to a confidence shock
(b) Response to an increase of production on all other islands
Figure 5: Amplification of the response to confidence shock
(a) Standard financial accelerator mechanism
(b) Strengthening of the strategic complementarity
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Financial frictions have two effects on this beauty contest representation of our static
model (see Appendix Section A.5.3) and we illustrate these effects in Figure 5. First, finan-
cial frictions strengthen the response to technology shocks, i.e. financial frictions increase κ
(Figure 5a). If an island believes that the others believe in a technological improvement, the
island believes that all other islands increase production by more. Second, financial frictions
strengthen the strategic complementarity between islands, i.e. financial frictions raise χ
(Figure 5b). For a given expected change in terms of trade, the island increases production
more strongly. Both effects together explain the strong amplification of the response to
confidence shocks.
The reason why the strengthening of the strategic complementarity χ does not matter
for the amplification of fundamental shocks is as follows. As in all complete information
rational expectation models, all agents know the true value of the current fundamentals and
know that all other agents do so as well. Hence, facing a fundamental shock, all islands know
that every island chooses exactly the same production level and there are no beliefs about
changes in terms of trade. It is as if only one island exists. Thus, the degree of strategic
complementarity does not matter for the equilibrium response to fundamental shocks. It
follows that the difference between the amplification effect for fundamental and confidence
shocks is explained completely by the strengthening of the strategic complementarity.
Amplification in the baseline model. The intuition gained from the illustrative static
beauty contest translates to our baseline model. Because the island set-up and information
structure in our baseline model are the same, the basic mechanism of a confidence shock
is also the same. Hence, the response to a confidence shock is determined by the reaction
of an island’s production to a technology shock and by the strategic complementarity. In
addition, financial frictions also strengthen both, the response to a technology shock and
the strategic complementarity.
The intuition of why the financial accelerator of BGG strengthens the response to tech-
nology shocks and the strategic complementarity is as follows. Financial frictions introduce
a risk premium Ψ between the safe rate Rit, at which households save, and the expected
return on capital Eit[Rkit+1]:
Eit[Rkit+1] = Ψ(nit+1, ·)Rit. (19)
The risk premium Ψ is inversely related to today’s net worth of entrepreneurs nit+1. Every-
thing else equal, a higher net worth mitigates the agency problem between entrepreneurs and
banks and hence reduces the risk premium. The reduction in the risk premium is compara-
ble to a reduction in investment taxes and therefore stimulates output. If net worth moves
pro-cyclically with output, the risk premium moves counter-cyclically and amplifies business
cycle movements. A technology shock causes such a pro-cyclical movement in net worth:
An improvement in technology raises the return on capital, which improves the profits and
hence the net worth position of entrepreneurs. In turn, the improved net worth position
reduces the risk premium which stimulates investment and, thereby, output. We refer to
beauty contest is written as ŷit = κ̄Eit[Ât] + χ̄Eit[Ŷt]. Hence our definition of the strategic complementarity
χ is equal to χ̄
1−χ̄ , where χ̄ is the standard definition of the strategic complementarity.
19
this strengthening effect as the “standard financial accelerator” effect—“standard” because
the influence of the financial accelerator on the response to fundamental shocks has been
studied thoroughly in the literature.
Regarding the strengthening of the strategic complementarity, a similar argumentation
applies. Following an increase in the production on all other islands, terms of trade improve
which raise the return on capital. In the presence of financial frictions, the larger return on
capital translates to an improved net worth position of entrepreneurs, which strengthens the
response of the island’s production to an increase in the terms of trade—or equivalently, to
an increase in aggregate production on all other islands. Hence, just like financial frictions
amplify the response of production to a technology shock, financial friction strengthen the
strategic complementarity between islands.
We now quantify the contribution of the standard financial accelerator effect and of the
strengthening of the strategic complementarity for the overall amplification of the response
to confidence shocks on impact. On impact, our model’s equilibrium response of output can
be represented in a way that resembles a static beauty contest:
Proposition 2. The equilibrium response of island i’s output on impact can be written as:
ŷit = κ̃Ât + χ̃Eit[Ŷt − ŷit], (20)
where κ̃ denotes the strength with which production on island i reacts to a fundamental
technology shock in equilibrium.
Proof: See Appendix Section A.6.
Because χ̃ represents the strategic complementarity in the context of a static beauty
contest, we use χ̃ as a measure for the strategic complementarity of our model on impact of
a given shock. To decompose the overall amplification effect for the response to confidence
shocks we make use of the following corollary.
Corollary 2.1. The equilibrium response of island i on impact of a given shock can be
written as:
ŷit = κ̃Ât + κ̃χ̃ξt
Proof: See Appendix Section A.6.
Using Corollary 2.1, the amplification effect of financial frictions to a confidence shock
is given by
ŷffit
ŷit
=
κ̃ffχ̃ff
κ̃χ̃
,
where the superscript ff denotes the objects of the model with financial frictions. The
amplification effect can thus be decomposed into the “standard” financial accelerator effect
(κ̃ff/κ̃) and the strengthening of strategic complementarity (χ̃ff/χ̃).
Quantitatively, the strengthening of the strategic complementarity is strong—much stronger
than the standard financial accelerator effect. The introduction of financial frictions raises
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the strategic complementarity (χ̃) by about 54%, whereas κ̃ increases only by 5.7%. Hence,
the strengthening of the strategic complementarity accounts for the bulk of the amplification
of the output’s response to confidence shocks by 64%.
4.2.2 Boom-bust pattern in investment
Figure 3 shows that the introduction of financial frictions also changes the propagation of
confidence shocks after impact. Especially the boom-bust like pattern of investment stands
out. After a strong boom on impact, investment drops much faster and eventually below
its long-run trend in the presence of financial frictions. Further, its trough response is more
than two percent below its steady state value and takes place one and a half years after im-
pact. Thereafter the investment activity recovers only slowly. Similarly, output and hours
also revert back to their trend values quicker than in the absence of financial frictions and
fall (slightly) below their steady states after a few quarters. This pattern stands in stark
contrast to the case without financial frictions, where all non-financial aggregates revert
back to their steady state values (almost) monotonically. The boom-bust like pattern in
investment is a specific feature of the interaction of confidence with financial frictions. With
other standard frictions or model add-ons like sticky prices, investment adjustment costs or
habit persistence, investment barely drops below its steady state after a positive innovation
in confidence has occurred.
The boom-bust pattern in investment occurs because entrepreneurs leverage their net
worth too much under the bias of a positive confidence shock. To give an intuition for this
boom-bust pattern, Figure 6 depicts the responses to a confidence shock for various variables
that are crucial for the entrepreneur’s decision making. The first panel depicts the realized
(black solid line) and the expected next period’s return on capital (green dashed line). The
second to fourth panels depict the realized (black solid line) and the ex-post optimal (red
dashed-dotted line) leverage choice levexpo, interest rate on bank loans Zexpo and bankruptcy
probability F (ω̄expo). We define levexpo as follows. As shocks hit the economy every period,
agents make errors when they forecast the return on capital. Hence, retrospectively, an
entrepreneur has chosen a too high (low) leverage level that is accompanied by too high
(low) costs of borrowing—as revenues from investment projects are lower (higher) than
expected—compared to the optimal choice that would have maximized the entrepreneur’s
net worth in the next period. The ex-post optimal leverage choice defines the leverage an
entrepreneur would choose if she foresaw the actual next period’s equilibrium return on
capital. In defining levexpo, we assume that only a small group of entrepreneurs chooses the
leverage level levexpo—so small that the group has no influence on aggregate outcomes.15 In
the same manner, we define Zexpo and F (ω̄expo). Zexpo and F (ω̄expo) are the interest rate
and the bankruptcy probability, a small group of entrepreneurs would face if they chose the
ex-post optimal leverage level levexpo. Details of the computation can be found in Appendix
Section A.7.
The boom-bust pattern hinges critically on the financial accelerator mechanism and the
persistent errors in forecasting the return on capital. A positive innovation in confidence
15More precisely, to compute the ex-post optimal variables, we also assume that the small group represents
the full distribution of idiosyncratic productivity levels ω. See Appendix Section A.7 for more details.
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Figure 6: IRFs to confidence: boom-bust
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net worth. The red dash-dotted IRFs depict the leverage an entrepreneur would choose from an ex-post
perspective and the accompanying interest rate and bankruptcy rate. The green dashed IRF depicts
next period’s expected return on capital in the second stage.
in period t induces entrepreneurs to be too optimistic about the terms of trade in period
t + 1. Hence, agents are too optimistic about the return on capital in period t + 1 (Figure
6, first panel). Based on these erroneous beliefs, entrepreneurs leverage their net worth in
period t too strongly. If an entrepreneur would have known the next period’s return on
capital in advance, she would have chosen a lower leverage level (Figure 6, second panel)
that would have gone along with a lower interest rate on her loans (Figure 6, third panel)
and a lower bankruptcy rate (Figure 6, fourth panel) in period t + 1. Stated differently,
the erroneous beliefs makes entrepreneurs willing to pay higher interest rates and induces
an overly risky behavior with regard to the bankruptcy probability. The too high interest
rate and too high bankruptcy rate result in a worse financial position compared to what
is achievable for an entrepreneur who chooses levexpo. Even though in period t + 1 the
return on capital is lower than expected, entrepreneurs are again too optimistic about the
next period’s return on capital. Just as in period t, entrepreneurs leverage again too much
in t + 1, which again has an inferior effect on aggregate net worth in period t + 2, and
so on. Therefore, net worth drops below the steady state after its initial boom (Figure 6,
fifth panel). The trough reaction of aggregate net worth is reached one and a half year after
impact. At this stage, confidence has vanished almost completely. The low level of net worth
persists as households refinance entrepreneurs only slowly. The boom-bust pattern in net
worth translates to a boom-bust pattern in investment. As net worth drops strongly after
the initial boom, the risk premium also deteriorates strongly after an initial boom. With
the deteriorating risk premium, the costs of investment increase strongly, which explains the
boom-bust pattern in investment. In turn, the boom-bust pattern in investment translates
to a lesser extent to output and hours.
In the absence of financial frictions, no boom-bust pattern in investment emerges. The
behavior of net worth no longer affects the cost of investment because there is no risk pre-
mium. Hence, even though entrepreneurs persistently over-estimate the return on capital in
face of a confidence shock, the risk premium does not deteriorate after an initial improve-
ment. Because the risk premium does not deteriorate, investment does no longer drop below
its steady state after a few periods. Also, no boom-bust pattern in investment emerges when
the errors in forecasting the return on capital are purely transitory. Figure 7 explains the
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Figure 7: IRFs to confidence: persistence
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Note: The first panel depicts the difference between the expected return on capital and the realized
return on capital. The second panel depicts the difference between the leverage choice and the leverage
choice entrepreneurs would choose from an ex-post perspective.
logic behind this claim. The figure depicts the response of the (second-stage) forecast er-
ror about the next period’s return on capital (difference between E′t[Rkt+1] and Rkt+1), the
difference between the actual and the ex-post optimal leverage choice, aggregate net worth,
investment and production to a confidence shock for different levels of persistence. In the
case of a purely transitory confidence shock process (ρξ = 0), agents’ forecast errors are
purely transitory. An innovation in confidence in period t only leads to a bias in the first-
stage expectations of agents on the impact of the shock. From the second stage onwards,
agents perfectly forecast the future behavior of the economy. Hence, when entrepreneurs
make their leverage choice, they correctly anticipate the next period’s return on capital. Be-
cause the chosen leverage levels (apart from the one in period t− 1) are optimal, net worth
and investment monotonically revert back to their long-run trend after the initial boom. In
contrast, if the confidence shock is persistent, entrepreneurs persistently overestimate the
return on capital.16 The more persistent the confidence shock, the longer the overestimation
of entrepreneurs persists. Hence, the drop in net worth is stronger and more prolonged for
more persistent confidence shock processes. For example, if the confidence shock exhibits a
half-life of two and a half quarters (ρξ = 0.75), the trough reaction of investment is about
4.7% below its long-run trend. This trough reaction is twice as strong as in our baseline
calibration (ρξ = 0.6, a half-life of 1.3 quarters). To sum up, the extent and existence of
the boom-bust pattern in our baseline model crucially depend on the persistence of the
confidence shock.
4.2.3 The role of confidence for business cycle fluctuations and welfare
The strong influence of financial frictions on the propagation of confidence shocks is also
reflected in the role of confidence for business cycle fluctuations and for welfare. The role of
confidence for business cycle fluctuations is shown in Table 3. The table reports the forecast
error variance (FEV) contribution of an innovation in confidence at different horizons in the
presence and in the absence of financial frictions. With financial frictions, confidence plays
an important role for the fluctuations in the economy, especially in the very short run. On
16Note that the forecast errors induced by fundamental shocks are always iid, irrespective whether the
fundamental shock process is persistent or not.
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Table 3: FEV contribution of confidence in % for different horizons
Y C H I Y/H N B Z/R
Model with financial frictions
Impact 48.61 37.35 96.70 62.41 23.92 65.39 55.36 65.49
1 year 16.61 15.79 89.33 47.68 5.53 71.99 94.10 88.08
Model without financial frictions
Impact 28.32 19.51 95.74 42.96 9.95 46.80 95.93 47.27
1 year 8.58 5.44 85.58 15.59 2.32 42.30 99.27 78.41
Table 4: Welfare cost of fluctuations due to confidence
λff λ λff/λ
0.07% 0.04% 1.6
Note: Welfare costs are
measured in terms of
steady state consumption.
impact, with the exception of the FEV of productivity, confidence explains between roughly
half to almost all of the FEV of both non-financial and financial aggregates on impact. The
contribution of confidence to the FEV of the non-financial variables vanishes quickly as the
horizon increases. For financial variables, confidence has a longer lasting influence.
For the model without financial frictions, the influence of confidence on the FEV is, with
the exception of credit, weaker on impact. For example, for output, the FEV contribution
on impact is more than 70% larger in the presence of financial frictions. At the one-year
horizon, the contribution to the FEV of output is almost twice as large. Hence, financial
frictions also increase the persistence of confidence’s influence on the FEV. Overall, these
observations highlight that financial frictions reinforce the role of confidence for business
cycle fluctuations.
The influence of financial frictions on the welfare costs of confidence-driven fluctuations is
shown in Table 4. The table depicts the welfare costs λ of fluctuations induced by confidence
in the presence (superscript ff) and the absence of financial frictions. The welfare costs are
measured in terms of steady state consumption that agents would sacrifice to avoid the
fluctuations. Details for the computation can be found in Appendix Section A.8. In the
presence of financial frictions, the welfare costs are about 60% larger. The pronounced
increase in the welfare costs of confidence-driven fluctuations underlines the strong influence
financial frictions exert on the propagation of confidence shocks.
4.3 Confidence about other fundamentals
Given the importance of technology shocks for generating business cycles, we focus on confi-
dence about technology in our baseline specification. In this section, we consider confidence
about other (non-financial) fundamentals and find that the interaction of financial frictions
24
Figure 8: IRF to confidence about different fundamentals
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and confidence remains the same.17 Figure 8 graphs the response of production, hours,
investment and first-order beliefs about aggregate production to an innovation in confidence
about technology, the household discount factor, investment-specific technology and news
about technology.18 The red solid line depicts the responses in the presence of financial
frictions (µ = 0.2), the black dashed-and-dotted line depicts the responses in the absence of
17We do not consider confidence about financial fundamentals. The reason is that in the absence of
financial frictions, financial shocks have no influence on the real, non-financial part of the economy. Hence,
confidence about financial fundamentals also has no influence on the economy in the absence of financial
frictions.
18We have also looked at other underlying fundamental shocks, e.g. government expenditure shocks. The
qualitative results remain the same.
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Table 5: Amplification decomposition: confidence about different fundamentals
Technology Discount Investment-specific News
Amplification confidence 64% 24% -17% 3%
Amplification fundamental 5.7% 6.5% -29% -11%
Strengthening strategic compl. 54% 16% 16% 16%
Note: News shocks are shocks to TFP that are anticipated one year in advance. Technology and
investment-specific technology shocks follow random walks. The discount factor shock is modeled
as an AR(1) processe. The persistence is chosen to maximize the amplification effect and leads to
ρdisc = 0.
financial frictions (µ = 0). Each confidence shock exhibits the same persistence as in our
baseline model. For the specifications of the underlying fundamental shock processes, see
Table 2.
Two observations stand out. First, up to a constant factor, the responses across the
different confidence shock specifications are exactly the same. And this is true for both
cases, with and without financial frictions. Hence, financial frictions have the same influence
on the dynamics of the responses to the different confidence shocks: Irrespective of whether
we consider confidence about technology or other fundamentals, financial frictions introduce
a boom-bust pattern and a slow recovery phase into the response of output, hours and
investment. The reason for the similarity in the responses and in the role of financial frictions
is as follows. A confidence shock affects an agent’s behavior by making him believe the other
islands’ agents change their behavior. The only channel how the other islands’ behavior can
affect the domestic island is via the centralized market. A higher production on all other
islands raises the demand for the own island’s specialized good and thereby improves the
domestic island’s terms of trade. Hence, in the context of our model, an innovation in
confidence about any fundamental can be interpreted as a shock to the perceived future
path of aggregate production, or similarly, terms of trade. Because of this similarity in the
mechanism of all confidence shocks, the responses and the influence of financial frictions are
the same up to a constant factor.
Second, while financial frictions exert the same influence on the dynamics of the re-
sponses, the amplification effect on impact differs across the different confidence shocks.
Table 5 presents the same decomposition of the amplification as in 4.2.1. The first line
depicts the overall amplification effect on the response of output on impact (ŷffit/ŷit) to the
different confidence shocks. The second line describes the “standard” financial accelerator
effect, i.e. how strongly financial frictions amplify the response of production to the under-
lying fundamental shock (κ̃ff/κ̃). The third line reports the strengthening of the strategic
complementarity as measured by χ̃ff/χ̃.
In our set-up, the amplification is weaker for confidence shocks about other fundamentals
than technology. Yet, across the board, we still observe a strengthening of the strategic
complementarity. For example, the response of output to an innovation in confidence about
the discount factor is amplified by 24%, whereas the response to an innovation in confidence
about investment-specific technology is even dampened by 17%. The difference in the overall
amplification effects mainly stems from the “standard financial accelerator” effect. Financial
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frictions amplify the output’s response to a discount factor shock by 6.5%, while they dampen
the response to an investment-specific technology shock by 29%. Yet, financial frictions
always strengthen the strategic complementarity by 16%, three times as strong as financial
frictions amplify the response of production to technology shocks.
5 Empirical application: confidence and the Great Re-
cession
In this section, we explore the role of confidence and its interaction with financial frictions
during the Great Recession in the US. Pursuing this task, we first augment our model and
introduce a financial shock, as financial shocks are considered to be an important source
for the Great Recession. More specifically, we include risk shocks—shocks on the disper-
sion of the idiosyncratic productivity level of entrepreneurs—as in CMR. Then we take our
extended model to the data and identify the innovation pattern that explains the Great
Recession. To identify the innovations, we use the Kalman filter and the Kalman smoother
on linearly detrended GDP, total hours worked, and consumption from 1962–2015.19 We
choose our observable series for the following reasons. First, we use real GDP as a mea-
sure for business cycle activity. Second, we use hours such that together with real GDP,
information about labor productivity is included. The information about labor productivity
helps to disentangle technology and confidence shocks because labor productivity decreases
in response to a confidence shock, whereas it has a positive response to a technology shock.
Third, we use consumption to distinguish between risk shocks and the other shocks. In
contrast to technology and confidence shocks, risk shocks lead to a counter-cyclical behav-
ior in consumption. We also considered data on investment instead of consumption as an
observable series, but the qualitative implications remain the same.
The left panel of Figure 9 depicts the identified confidence shock pattern. The gray
shaded area denotes the time span between the NBER peak and trough dates. The presented
confidence shock series is scaled by its standard deviation. Through the lens of our model,
the US economy was characterized by a wave of unfounded optimism at the end of 2007
and the beginning of 2008. In 2008, unfounded optimism vanished quickly and turned into
strong unfounded pessimism. The right panel of Figure 9 shows the empirical path and two
counterfactual paths of US GDP. The red counterfactual depicts the evolution of GDP if only
innovations in confidence would have hit the economy, beginning at the start of the recession.
That is, from 2007Q4 onwards, the other two shocks are set to zero. The comparison to the
empirical evolution (black line) tells us the contribution of confidence shocks to the fall in
GDP. From the NBER peak to the trough date, GDP dropped from 3.9% above to 4.4%
below trend. If only innovations in confidence would have occurred, the drop would have
been only slightly milder. At the NBER trough date, GDP would have been 2.8% below
trend. Hence, the drop in confidence can account for about 80% of the drop of US GDP.
The blue line depicts the counterfactual path of the same experiment but without fi-
19For the data description, see Appendix Section A.2. For the calibration of the risk shock, see Appendix
Section A.9.
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Figure 9: Confidence shock and counterfactual path of GDP
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Note: Right panel: Counterfactual evolution of GDP when only confidence shocks hit the economy (red)
and when, additionally, there are no financial frictions (blue).
nancial frictions from 2007Q4 onwards. The comparison between the first and the second
counterfactual experiment indicates the importance of the interaction between confidence
and financial frictions for the role of confidence for the Great Recession. In the absence of
financial frictions, the influence of confidence on GDP would have been smaller. The drop
in confidence would have only led to a drop in GDP to 0.3% above its long-run trend in
2009Q2. Hence without the interaction with financial frictions, confidence can only account
for about 40% of the drop of US GDP.
Through the lens of our model, an unfounded wave of aggregate optimism in 2007 and
the beginning of 2008 led entrepreneurs to leverage their net worth too strongly and take
excessive risk. After an initial boom, the excessive lending and risk-taking caused the net
worth of entrepreneurs to fall as the return on investment was lower than expected and more
entrepreneurs had to declare bankruptcy. Eventually, the unfounded optimism turned into
unfounded pessimism. The net worth of entrepreneurs dropped further and inferior credit
conditions led to a strong reduction in aggregate investment which also reduced activity in
the real, non-financial part of the economy. In the absence of financial frictions, the wave of
optimism would not have improved the credit conditions and, hence, entrepreneurs would
not have borrowed as much. Additionally, during the downturn, the drop in net worth would
not have magnified the adverse effects on investment and the downturn would have been
much milder.
This rationale fits well with the narrative that financial institutions invested too heavily
in the mortgage market and subsequently suffered from large losses or even had to de-
clare bankruptcy. In our model, entrepreneurs can be interpreted as both, firms in the
non-financial business sector, or as financial firms that hold a non-diversified portfolio of
loans to risky non-financial firms.20 Hence, financial institutions heavily exposed to the
mortgage market such as Bear Stearns or Lehman Brothers should be rather interpreted as
entrepreneurs than banks in the context of our model.
20See CMR and Christiano and Ikeda (2011) for a more thorough discussion of the interpretation of
entrepreneurs.
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6 Concluding remarks
Recent events such as the Great Recession have highlighted feedbacks between confidence
and financial markets. Understanding this interaction is essential to conduct the appropriate
policy intervention and prevent future crises. In this paper, we make progress along this
frontier by augmenting an RBC economy with financial frictions under incomplete infor-
mation. We show that financial frictions interact with confidence and strongly amplify the
effect of confidence shocks. Our mechanism also helps to explain the observed boom-bust
pattern and the slow recovery in economic activity which are typically associated with fi-
nancial recessions. Following a positive confidence shock, entrepreneurs are over-leveraged
and end up with a depressed level of net worth which is accompanied by a prolonged fall in
investment activity. An interesting avenue for further research is to specify a housing sector,
as the mortgage market is suspected to be a crucial element of various crises, including the
Great Recession. This extension would allow studying how debt and leverage decisions of
households interact with confidence.
29
References
Angeletos, G.-M., Collard, F., & Dellas, H. (2018). Quantifying Confidence. Econometrica,
forthcoming.
Angeletos, G.-M. & La’O, J. (2013). Sentiments. Econometrica, 81 (2), 739–779.
Angeletos, G.-M., Lorenzoni, G., & Pavan, A. (2010). Beauty Contests and Irrational Exu-
berance: A Neoclassical Approach. National Bureau of Economic Research.
Barinci, J.-P. & Chéron, A. (2001). Sunspots and the Business Cycle in a Finance Con-
strained Economy. Journal of Economic Theory, 97 (1), 30–49.
Benhabib, J., Liu, X., & Wang, P. (2016). Sentiments, Financial Markets, and Macroeco-
nomic Fluctuations. Journal of Financial Economics, 120 (2), 420–443.
Benhabib, J., Wang, P., & Wen, Y. (2015). Sentiments and Aggregate Demand Fluctuations.
Econometrica, 83 (2), 549–585.
Bergemann, D., Heumann, T., & Morris, S. (2015). Information and Volatility. Journal of
Economic Theory, 158, 427–465.
Bergemann, D. & Morris, S. (2013). Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Infor-
mation. Econometrica, 81 (4), 1251–1308.
Bernanke, B. S., Gertler, M., & Gilchrist, S. (1999). The Financial Accelerator in a Quan-
titative Business Cycle Framework. Handbook of Macroeconomics, 1, 1341–1393.
Bosi, S., Magris, F., & Venditti, A. (2007). Sunspot Fluctuations in Two-Sector Economies
with Heterogeneous Agents. Economic Theory, 33 (2), 311–331.
Christiano, L. & Fitzgerald, T. (2003). The Band Pass Filter. International Economic Re-
view, 44 (2), 435–465.
Christiano, L. & Ikeda, D. (2011). Government Policy, Credit Markets and Economic Ac-
tivity. National Bureau of Economic Research.
Christiano, L., Motto, R., & Rostagno, M. (2003). The Great Depression and the Friedman-
Schwartz Hypothesis. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 35 (6), 1119–1197.
Christiano, L., Motto, R., & Rostagno, M. (2014). Risk Shocks. American Economic Review,
104 (1), 27–65.
Cooper, R. W. & Haltiwanger, J. C. (2006). On the Nature of Capital Adjustment Costs.
The Review of Economic Studies, 73 (3), 611–633.
Dmitriev, M. & Hoddenbagh, J. (2017). The Financial Accelerator and the Optimal State-
Dependent Contract. Review of Economic Dynamics, 24, 43–65.
Goldstein, I., Ozdenoren, E., & Yuan, K. (2013). Trading Frenzies and Their Impact on Real
Investment. Journal of Financial Economics, 109 (2), 566–582.
Hall, R. E. (2004). Measuring Factor Adjustment Costs. The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 119 (3), 899–927.
Huo, Z. & Takayama, N. (2015). Higher Order Beliefs, Confidence, and Business Cycles.
University of Minnesota working paper.
30
Keynes, J. M. (1936). The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. (pp. 321–
322). New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company.
Kiyotaki, N. & Moore, J. (1997). Credit Cycles. Journal of Political Economy, 105 (2), 211–
48.
La’O, J. (2010). Collateral Constraints and Noisy Fluctuations. Society for Economic Dy-
namics, 2010 Meeting Papers(780).
Liu, Z. & Wang, P. (2014). Credit Constraints and Self-Fulfilling Business Cycles. American
Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 6 (1), 32–69.
Morris, S. & Shin, H. S. (2002). Social Value of Public Information. The American Economic
Review, 92 (5), 1521–1534.
Woodford, M. (1986). Stationary Sunspot Equilibria in a Finance Constrained Economy.
Journal of Economic Theory, 40 (1), 128–137.
31
A Appendix
A.1 The model
In the following, the general equilibrium conditions, the steady state conditions as well as the
log-linearized general equilibrium conditions of our model are presented in a condensed form.
In contrast to the main body of the text, we assume that firms can adjust the utilization of
capital at a cost. Hence, the firms maximization problem writes:
max
kit,hit,uit
πit = pityit − withit − rkitkit − ψ(uit)kit, ,
s.t. yit = At(kituit)αh1−αit ,
ψ(uit) = ψ0(u
1
1−ψ
it − u
1
1−ψ
st.st.), ψ0 > 0
The case of fixed capital utilization is nested within this formulation and is obtained when
ψ = 1. The list of general equilibrium equations is:
Local representative households optimality conditions:
wit = (1− α)
Eit[pityit]
hit
⇒ wit = (1− α)
Eit[Yt]
hit
(21)
rkit = α
Eit[pityit]
kit
− Eit[ψ(uit)] (22)
α
Yt
kit
= ψ′(uit)uit (23)
Local representative capital producers optimality conditions:
1
q̄it
= 1− Φ
(
iit
kit
)
− Φ′
(
iit
kit
)
iit
kit
investment demand (24)
q̄it =
qit(1− δ) + iitkit
(1− δ) + iitkit
(
1− Φ
(
iit
kit
)) zero profit condition (25)
Local representative households optimality conditions:
c−σcit = βRitE
′
it[c
−σc
i,t+1] (26)
hνit = Eit[c
−σc
it ]wit (27)
Exogenous evolution of households transfers to entrepreneurs (w/Y exogenous):
weit =
w
Y
pityit ⇒ weit =
w
Y
Yt (28)
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Entrepreneurs rate of return:
Rkit+1 =
rit+1 + qit+1(1− δ)
q̄it
(29)
Entrepreneurs optimality condition:
E′it
Ajt
 1− Γt(ω̄Njit+1)
1− R
k
it+1
Rit
(
Γt(ω̄N
j
it+1)− µGt(ω̄N
j
it+1)
)×
Rkit+1
Rit
(
1− Ft(ω̄N
j
it+1)− µω̄N
j
it+1F
′
t (ω̄
Nj
it+1)
)]}
= E′it
{
Ajt
[
1− Ft(ω̄N
j
it+1)
]}
,
with Ajt ≡
Λit,t+1R
k
it+1
1− R
k
it+1
Rit
(
Γt(ω̄N
j
it+1)− µGt(ω̄N
j
it+1)
) , Λit,t+1 = βu′(cit+1)/u′(cit), (30)
Ft(ω̄t+1) = Φ
(
ln(ω̄t+1)− µ
σω,t
)
, µ = −
σ2ω,t
2
, Gt(ω̄t+1) = Φ
(
ln ω̄t+1 − 12σ
2
ω,t
σω,t
)
,
(31)
Γt(ω̄t+1) = Φ
(
ln ω̄t+1 − 12σ
2
ω,t
σω,t
)
+ ω̄t+1
(
1− Φ
(
ln ω̄t+1 +
1
2σ
2
ω,t
σω,t
))
(32)
Aggregate zero profit condition of banks:
q̄itkit+1
nit+1
=
1
1− R
k
t+1
Rt
(Γt(ω̄t+1)− µGt(ω̄t+1))
(33)
Aggregate net worth:
nit+1 = γ[1− Γt−1(ω̄it)]Rkitq̄it−1kit + weit (34)
Final goods market clearing:
Yt = cit + iit + ψ(uit)kit + µGt−1(ω̄it)R
k
itq̄it−1kit (35)
Law of motion of raw capital:
ki,t+1 = (1− δ)kit + iit
(
1− Φ
(
iit
kit
))
(36)
Local goods producers production function:
yit = ath
1−α
it (uitkit)
α (37)
Some further useful definitions:
Aggregate credit:
bit+1 = q̄itkit+1 − nit+1
Interest on credit:
zit+1 = R
k
it+1ω̄it+1
q̄itkit+1
bit+1
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The relevant steady state values of the endogenous variables are:
R = 1/β
q̄ = 1
q = 1
Rk = R
1− F (ω̄)
(1− Γ(ω̄))(1− F (ω̄)− µω̄F ′(ω̄)) + (1− F (ω̄))(Γ(ω̄)− µG(ω̄))
k
Y
=
α
Rk − (1− δ)
k
n
=
1
1− RkR (Γ(ω̄)− µG(ω̄))
n
Y
=
k/Y
k/N
x
Y
= δ
k
Y
(also with investment adjustment costs)
c
Y
= 1− x
Y
− µG(ω̄)Rk k
Y
h =
[
1− α
c/Y
] 1
1+ν
b
Y
=
k
Y
− n
Y
The list of log-linearized general equilibrium equations is:
(I) ŷit = α(ûit + k̂it) + (1− α)ĥit + ât
(II) ˆ̄qit = ϕ(̂iit − k̂it)⇒
(III) r̂it = Ŷt − k̂it − ûit
(IV ) Ŷt − k̂it =
1
1− ψ
ûit
(V ) R̂kit =
αYk
Rk
(Eit[Ŷt]− k̂it − Eit[ûit]) +
1− δ
Rk
q̂it − ˆ̄qit−1, ˆ̄qit = (1− δ)q̂it
⇒ R̂kit =
αYk
Rk
(Eit[Ŷt]− k̂it − Eit[ûit]) +
1
Rk
ˆ̄qit − ˆ̄qit−1
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(V I)
Rk
R
((1− F (ω̄)− µω̄F ′ω̄(ω̄))(1− Γ(ω̄)) + ...
+(1− F (ω̄))(Γ(ω̄)− µG(ω̄))) (E′it[R̂kit+1]− R̂it) +
Rk
R
(
F ′ω̄(ω̄)
R
Rk
+ ...
(−F ′ω̄(ω̄)− µω̄F ′′ω̄,ω̄(ω̄)− µF ′ω̄(ω̄))(1− Γ(ω̄)) + (1− F (ω̄)− µω̄F ′ω̄(ω̄))(−Γ′ω̄(ω̄)) + ...
+(−F ′ω̄(ω̄))(Γ(ω̄)− µG(ω̄)) + (1− F (ω̄))(Γ′ω̄(ω̄)− µG′ω̄(ω̄))) ω̄E′it[ˆ̄ωit+1] + ...
...
Rk
R
(
F ′σω (ω̄)
R
Rk
+ (−F ′σω (ω̄)− µω̄F
′′
ω̄,σω (ω̄))(1− Γ(ω̄)) + ...
(1− F (ω̄)− µω̄F ′ω̄(ω̄))(−Γ′σω (ω̄)) + (−F
′
σω (ω̄))(Γ(ω̄)− µG(ω̄)) + ...
(1− F (ω̄))(Γ′σω (ω̄)− µG
′
σω (ω̄))
)
σωσ̂ω,t
(V II)
n
Y
n̂it+1 = γ(1− Γ(ω̄))Rk
k
Y
(R̂kit + ˆ̄qit−1 + k̂it)− ...
γΓ′ω̄(ω̄)R
k k
Y
ω̄ ˆ̄ωit − γΓ′σω (ω̄)R
kK
Y
σωσ̂ω,it−1 +
we
Y
ŵeit
(V III) ŵeit = Ŷt
(IX)
n
Y
(ˆ̄qit−1 + k̂it)−
Rk
R
(Γ(ω̄)− µG(ω̄)) k
Y
(R̂kit − R̂it−1)−
Rk
R
K
Y
(Γ′ω̄(ω̄)− µG′ω̄(ω̄))ω̄ ˆ̄ωit
....− R
k
R
K
Y
(Γ′σω (ω̄)− µG
′
σω (ω̄))σωσ̂ω,it−1 =
n
Y
n̂it
(X) − σcĉit = R̂it − σCE′it[ĉit+1]
(XI) (1 + ν)ĥit = −σcEit[ĉit] + Eit[Ŷt]
(XII)
c
Y
ĉit +
x
Y
x̂it + αûit + µG
′
ω̄(ω̄)ω̄R
k k
Y
ˆ̄ωit + µG
′
σω (ω̄)σωR
kK
Y
σ̂ω,it−1 + ...
µG(ω̄)Rk
k
Y
(R̂kit + k̂it + ˆ̄qit−1) = Ŷt
(XIII) k̂it+1 = (1− δ)k̂it + δx̂it
(XIV ) at = ρaat−1 + εa,t
(XV ) σω,t = ρσωσω,t−1 + εω,t
Additional equations not needed to close model (definitions):
b
Y
b̂it+1 =
k
Y
(ˆ̄qit + k̂it+1)−
n
Y
n̂it+1
ẑit = R̂
k
it + ˆ̄qit−1 + k̂it + ˆ̄ωit − b̂it
ˆLevit = ˆ̄qit + k̂it+1 − n̂it+1
ˆrisksprit = ẑit − R̂it
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A.2 Data
We use quarterly observations for 7 macroeconomic US series covering the period from
1962Q1–2015Q1. The series for GDP, consumption, investment and hours worked are stan-
dard in the empirical analysis of aggregate data. The other 3 series are measures for the
financial variables credit, net worth, and the interest spread. All series but the interest
spread are measured in real, per capita terms.21 We use the same measure for credit Bt+1
in period t as CMR, i.e. we use data on credit to non-financial firms taken from the flow of
funds dataset constructed by the US Federal Reserve Board. The period t measure for net
worth is built using the S&P 500 stock market index. The indicator for the credit spread
is built similarly to CMR, i.e. the credit spread is measured by the difference between the
interest rate on BAA-rated corporate bonds and the federal funds rate. The data series are
illustrated in table 6.
21In order to account for the jumps in the US population, we take the HP-filtered trend of the civilian
noninstitutional population over 16 series when we deflate the variables by population growth.
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Data Formula
GDP GDP = NGDP/(GDPDEF × CNP16OV )
Consumption C = (NCND +NCS)/(GDPDEF × CNP16OV )
Investment I = (NCD +NFPI +NDI)/(GDPDEF × CNP16OV )
Hours H = AWH ∗ CEV O16/CNP16OV (similar to CMR)
Net worth N = Stock/(GDPDEF × CNP16OV )
Credit B=(CNF + CNFA)/(GDPDEF × CNP16OV )
Interest Spread ZsR=((1 + (NZ −NFED)/100) 14 − 1)× 100
Data Description and source
NGDP US nominal GDP, seasonally adjusted, Index 2009. Bureau
of Economic Analysis (BEA)
GDPDEF US GDP implicit price deflator, seasonally adjusted,
Index 2009. BEA
CNP16OV Civilian noninstitutational population over 16. Bureau
of Labor Statistics (BLS)
CEVO16 Civilian employment over 16. BLS
NCND Nominal personal consumption expenditure: nondurable goods,
seasonally adjusted. BEA
NCS Nominal personal consumption expenditure: services, seasonally
adjusted. BEA
NCD Nominal personal consumption expenditure: durable goods,
seasonally adjusted. BEA
NFPI Nominal fixed private investment, seasonally adjusted. BEA
NDI Nominal change in private inventories, seasonally adjusted. BEA
AWH Average weakly hours, nonfarm business, seasonally adjusted,
Index 2009. BLS
Stock S&P 500 stock market index.
CNF Credit market instruments, total net borrowing and lending of
nonfarm, nonfinancial corporate businesses, seasonally adjusted.
Federal Reserve, US
CNFA Credit market instruments, total net borrowing, and lending of
nonfarm, noncorporate businesses, seasonally adjusted.
Federal Reserve, US
NZ Daily interest rates Moodys seasoned BAA rated corporated
bonds. Federal Reserve, US
NFED Daily Federal Funds Effective Rate. Federal Reserve, US
Table 6: Description of the data
37
A.3 Business cycle moments
For the data analysis, the logarithm of all series except the interest spread is taken and
all series are Bandpass-filtered at frequencies corresponding to 6-32 quarters.22 Thus, the
filtered data reflects log-deviations from the trend, i.e. all series can now be compared to
their theoretical counterparts in terms of deviations from steady state.
St. dev.: Y C H I B N ZR
Y
H
Data 1.44 0.86 1.28 5.28 2.04 9.58 0.33 0.63
Model 1.29 0.82 1.07 5.38 1.15 3.04 0.04 0.77
Corr.: C,Y H,Y I,Y B,Y N,Y ZR ,Y C,H I,H C,I Y,
Y
H H,
Y
H
Data 0.87 0.90 0.95 0.21 0.62 -0.63 0.86 0.89 0.80 0.45 0.01
Model 0.89 0.79 0.90 -0.19 0.76 -0.63 0.62 0.80 0.61 0.44 -0.17
Table 7: Bandpass-filtered moments (6-32 quarters)
A.4 Size of σξ
In our baseline model, σξ is much larger than σa. Intuitively, if the uncertainty faced by
agents regarding the variability in an economic fundamental (payoff uncertainty) is much
smaller than the uncertainty faced by agents due to higher-order beliefs about that funda-
mental (higher-order uncertainty), there are doubts about the plausibility of the formulated
mechanism for higher-order uncertainty.23 However, because of the persistence of shocks and
the forward-looking aspects exhibited by our model, we cannot simply compare the stan-
dard deviations of the innovations to assess the payoff uncertainty faced by agents relative to
higher-order uncertainty. For a more sophisticated assessment, we apply the present-value
metric proposed by ACD: Let FTt be the present value of first-order beliefs about TFP from
period t to period t+ T , and STt be the present value of the second-order belief about TFP
from period t to period t+T . Further let BTt ≡ STt −FTt be the difference of these measures,
which arises due to the confidence shock ξt:
FTt = Et
 T∑
j=0
βjat+j
 , STt = Et
 T∑
j=0
βj(at+j + ξt+j)
 , BTt = Et
 T∑
j=0
βjξt+j
 .
In order to get a rough measure for the higher-order uncertainty faced by agents relative to
the payoff uncertainty, we consider the standard deviation of BTt relative to FTt from the
perspective in period t − 1. Thus, for an agent in period t − 1, the ratio χa,ξ gives us the
rough measure:
χa,ξ =
V (BTt |t− 1, t− 2, ...)
V (FTt |t− 1, t− 2, ...)
.
22The bandpass filter is preferable to the simpler HP filter because it removes all high-frequency “noise”
and low-frequency trends; see Stock and Watson (1999).
23ACD emphasize that for static common-prior settings, methods exist to obtain a bound on the size of
the higher-order uncertainty as a function of the underlying payoff uncertainty, developed in Bergemann and
Morris (2013) and Bergemann, Heumann, and Morris (2015). However, an analogous method does not yet
exist for dynamic settings.
38
Under the baseline calibration we observe a ratio of 1.87 for T = 8 years and a ratio of 0.09 for
T =∞. Thus, the implied higher-order uncertainty relative to the payoff uncertainty of our
calibration is relatively high. However, as soon as we introduce variable capital utilization
into our model these ratios drop strongly. For example if we assume ψ = 0.3 as in ACD, the
same calibration exercise delivers σξ = 4.02, σa = 0.62. The corresponding χa,ξ ratios drop
to 0.30 for T = 8 years and to 0.01 for T =∞. Hence, with variable capital utilization, the
higher-order uncertainty relative to the payoff uncertainty is rather modest. In the main
body of the text, we abstract from variable capital utilization to keep the explanation of the
amplification effects as simple as possible. The introduction of capital utilization does not
change the qualitative insights and only mildly affects the quantitative insights.
A.5 A model with input financing constraints
A.5.1 Model description
Consider a model economy that has the same island and information structure as our baseline
model. The model economy consists of a continuum of islands, indexed by i, and a mainland.
Islands are connected with each other via the production of a final good. Each island i
produces a specialized good, that is used as a complement in the final good production. The
only difference between the model economy and the baseline model is that the island specific
economies are different. The representative household on island i maximizes the following
objective
max
cit,Lit,hit
(
cit −
h1+νit
1+ν
)1−ρ
1− ρ
+
L1−γit
1− γ
s.t. Ptcit + qitLit ≤ withit + πit,
where cit is consumption, Lit is land, hit is hours worked, Pt the price of consumption
goods (which we normalize to 1), qit is the price of land and πit is the share of profits of a
household. The households optimality conditions are:
hνit = wit,
Eit[λit]qit = L−γit ,
λit =
(
cit −
h1+νit
1 + ν
)−ρ
.
Households make their labor supply and the land demand decision in the first-stage. The
consumption decision takes place in the second-stage.
The representative firms maximization problem is as follows:
max
hit
πit = pityit − withit
(
1 + τ
(
withit
qitLit
))
+ qitLit
τ(st.st.) = τ ′(st.st.) = 0, τ ′′(st.st.)
(
wh
qL
)2
= ϕ > 0
yit = Ath
1−α
it
The representative firm earns revenues from two sources. First, it produces a specialized
good yit that it sells at price pit on the mainland. Second, firms are endowed with land
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Lit, which they sell at price qit. The costs of hiring workers takes a special form. This
form, in a reduced form way, is designed to capture financial frictions of the financing of
labor input through the function τ . The idea is that firms need to finance labor input withit
before they receive revenues. Land serves as a collateral. For a given value of the collateral
qitLit, a higher amount of lending withit raises the financing costs. In contrast, the larger
the value of the collateral, the lower are the additional cost generated by financial frictions.
The optimal labor choice satisfies:
(1− α)Eit[Yt]
hit
= wit
(
1 + τ
(
withit
qitLit
)
+ τ ′
(
withit
qitLit
)
withit
qitLit
)
The model is completely characterized by the following set of general equilibrium equations:
hνit = wit
(1− α)Eit[Yt]
hit
= wit
(
1 + τ
(
withit
qitL̄i
)
+ τ ′
(
withit
qitLit
)
withit
qitL̄i
)
Eit[λit]qit = L̄−γi
λit =
(
cit −
h1+νit
1 + ν
)−ρ
yit = Ath
1−α
it
cit = Yt − withitτ
(
withit
qitL̄i
)
In order to transform the static model into a linear model, we take a log-linear approximation
around its steady state:24
νĥit = ŵit
Eit[Ŷt]− ĥit = ŵit + ϕ
(
ŵit + ĥit − q̂it
)
Eit[λ̂it] = −q̂it
λ̂it = −ρ
Y
λ
−1
ρ
Ŷt + ρ
h1+ν
1+ν
λ
−1
ρ
(1 + ν)ĥit
ŷit = Ât + (1− α)ĥit
Ŷt =
c
Y
ĉit +
(
whτ
(
wh
qL̄
)
+ whτ ′
(
wh
qL̄
)
wh
qL̄
)(
ŵit + ĥit
)
− whτ
(
wh
qL̄
)
q̂it
24To have a steady state, we need to assume that the technology shock is stationary.
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A.5.2 Beauty contest representation and solution
We can obtain the same equilibrium outcome from a beauty contest between islands:
Eit[Ŷt] = (1 + ν)(1 + ϕ)ĥit − ϕρ
Y
λ
−1
ρ
Eit[Ŷt] + ϕρ
h1+ν
1+ν
λ
−1
ρ
(1 + ν)ĥit
⇒ ŷit = Eit[Ât] +BEit[Ŷt],
B ≡
(
1 + ϕρ Y
λ
−1
ρ
)
(1− α)
(1 + ν)
(
1 + ϕ
(
1 + ρ
h1+ν
1+ν
λ
−1
ρ
)) ,
Y = A1+(1−α)(ν+α)(1− α)(1−α)(ν+α),
h = [(1− α)A]ν+α,
λ =
(
Y − h
1+ν
1 + ν
)−ρ
.
B denotes the standard definition of the strategic complementarity between island’s produc-
tion choices. In the form used in the main body we have:
ŷit =κEit[Ât] + χEit[Ŷt − ŷit],
κ ≡ 1
1−B
, χ ≡ B
1−B
.
Proof of Proposition 1. The solution of the beauty contest
ŷit = Eit[Ât] +BEit[Ŷt]
can be obtained by forward iteration and applying the heterogeneous prior setting:
ŷit = Eit[Ât] +BEit[Ŷt]
= E1it[Ât] +BE2it[Ât] +B2E3it[Ât] +B3E4it[Ât]...
where Ekit[·] is the kth-order belief about the fundamental:
E2it = Eit[Ēt[Ât]], E3it = Eit[Ēt[Ēt[Ât]]], ...; Ēt[·] =
∫
Ejt[·]dj.
For a fundamental shock, all agents share the same information and therefore the law of
iterated expectations applies. However, in the case of confidence shocks the information
sets are heterogenous. Hence, the law of iterated expectations is no longer applicable. The
advantage of the heterogenous prior setting is that it simplifies the structure of higher-order
beliefs. Under the heterogenous prior setting, we assume ft and ξt are perfectly observed.
Beliefs satisfy
Eit[Ât] = Ât
Eit[Ejt[Ât]] = Eit[Ât] + ξt = Ât + ξt
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where j indicates another island j 6= i. Since any island i knows that all other islands are
alike, we have Ejt[·] = Ēt[·] from perspective of island i. Ongoing iteration leads to:
E1it[Ât] = Ât
E2it[Ât] = Eit[Ēt[Ât]] = Ât + ξt
E3it[Ât] = Eit[Ēt[Ēt[Ât]]] = Ât + ξt + ξt
= ...
Ekit[Ât] = Ât + (k − 1)ξt.
Therefore in equilibrium, output reacts as follows to fundamental and confidence shocks:
yit =E1it[Ât] +BE2it[Ât] +B2E3it[Ât] +B3E4it[Ât]...
=Ât +BÂt +B
2Ât +B
3Ât + ...
...+Bξt +B
2ξt +B
3ξt + ...
...B2ξt +B
3ξt + ...
...B3ξt + ...
yit =
1
1−B
Ât +
B
(1−B)2
ξt.
Using the definition of κ and χ, we obtain:
ŷit = κÂt + κχξt.
A.5.3 Amplification effect
In order for financial frictions (ϕ > 0)to amplify the response to a technology shock we need
κ(ϕ > 0) > κ(ϕ = 0). This condition is equivalent to a larger B when ϕ > 0 compared to
ϕ = 0:
B(ϕ > 0) > B(ϕ = 0)(
1 + ϕρ Y
λ
−1
ρ
)
(1− α)
(1 + ν)
(
1 + ϕ
(
1 + ρ
h1+ν
1+ν
λ
−1
ρ
)) > 1− α
1 + ν
ϕρ
Y − h
1+ν
1+ν
λ
−1
ρ
> ϕ
ρ > 1
Hence, a necessary and sufficient condition is ρ > 1.
If B(ϕ > 0) > B(ϕ = 0), we furthermore have that χ(ϕ > 0) > χ(ϕ = 0). Hence,
financial frictions strengthen the strategic complementarity between islands.25
25The standard definition of the strategic complementarity parameter in a beauty contest model is χ
1+χ
,
which is increasing in χ.
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A.6 Quantifying the amplification effect
Proof of Proposition 2. The policy rule for production on island i is:
ŷit = akk̂it + ann̂it + κ̃ât + aξξt.
First order beliefs about aggregate output are:
Eit[Ŷt] = Eit[ŷjt] = ak Eit[k̂jt]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=kit=Kt
+an Eit[n̂jt]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=nit=Nt
+κ̃Eit[Ejt[ât]]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=ât+ξt
+aξ Eit[Ejt[ξ̂t]]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=ξt
It follows that first order beliefs about terms of trade can be rewritten as function of the
confidence shock only:
Eit[Ŷt − ŷit] = κ̃ξt
Hence, the response of production on island i can be written as:
ŷit = akk̂it + ann̂it + κ̃ât + χ̃Eit[Ŷt − ŷit], χ̃ ≡
aξ
κ̃
Finally, capital kit and net worth nit are predetermined. Hence, for the response of output
on impact it is k̂it = n̂it = 0.
Proof of Corollary 2.1. From the proof of Proposition 2 follows aξ = κ̃χ̃. Hence, using the
policy rule and using k̂it = n̂it = 0 delivers:
ŷit = κ̃ât + κ̃χ̃ξt.
A.7 Ex-post optimal leverage choice, interest rate and bankruptcy
probability
The optimal leverage decision of entrepreneurs is obtained from maximizing the entrepreneurs’
objective subject to the zero profit condition of banks. To compute the ex-post optimal lever-
age decision, we simply impose the realized instead of the equilibrium expectations about
the next period’s return on capital. In log-linearized terms:
l̂evit = υ
(
E′it[R̂kit+1]− R̂it
)
,
l̂ev
expo
it = υ
(
R̂kit+1 − R̂it
)
,
where υ =
(
C +DAB
)
> 0, and where steady state terms A,B,C and D are given by
A ≡R
k
R
((1− F (ω̄)− µω̄F ′ω̄(ω̄))(1− Γ(ω̄)) + (1− F (ω̄))(Γ(ω̄)− µG(ω̄))) ,
B ≡R
k
R
(
F ′ω̄(ω̄)
R
Rk
+ (−F ′ω̄(ω̄)− µω̄F ′′ω̄,ω̄(ω̄)− µF ′ω̄(ω̄))(1− Γ(ω̄)) + ...
(1− F (ω̄)− µω̄F ′ω̄(ω̄))(−Γ′ω̄(ω̄)) + ...
+(−F ′ω̄(ω̄))(Γ(ω̄)− µG(ω̄)) + (1− F (ω̄))(Γ′ω̄(ω̄)− µG′ω̄(ω̄))) ω̄,
C ≡Y
n
Rk
R
(Γ(ω̄)− µG(ω̄)) k
Y
,
D ≡Y
n
µG′ω̄(ω̄))ω̄.
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Thus, the ex-post optimal leverage decision takes the perspective of a small group of
entrepreneurs—small enough such that they have no influence on the aggregate outcomes
but at the same time the group represents the full distribution of idiosyncratic productivity
levels ω—that know in advance the next period’s return on capital. Hence, l̂ev
expo
it is an off-
equilibrium concept. The small group assumption is needed in order that the bank can offer
the state-contingent contract defined by equation (11). The schedule of state-contingent
contract of banks implicitly assumes that always a continuum of entrepreneurs makes the
same leverage choice. Hence, the contract schedule of banks is based on the assumption that
banks can diversify away the idiosyncratic risk. If we consider only a single entrepreneur
that makes a specific leverage choice, banks can not diversify away the idiosyncratic risk
component and the contract schedule would take a different form.
The ex-post optimal interest payment and bankruptcy probability is obtained in a similar
manner. To obtain the optimal bankruptcy probability, we first compute the ex-post optimal
bankruptcy threshold ω̄expo. We obtain ω̄expo by imposing the next period’s realized return
on capital in entrepreneurs optimal contract decision:26
Entrepreneurs optimal contract choice:
A
(
E′it[R̂kit+1]− R̂it
)
+BE′it[̂̄ωit+1]
Entrepreneurs optimal contract choice given the return on capital:
̂̄ωexpoit+1 = AB (R̂kit+1 − R̂it)
Ex-post optimal bankruptcy probability:
̂F (ω̄expoit+1 ) = f(ω̄)ω̄ ˆ̄ω
expo
it+1
If the small group of entrepreneurs that knows next period’s return on capital in advance
chooses the ex-post optimal leverage level, it faces a bankruptcy probability that equals
F (ω̄expot+1 ).
The ex-post optimal interest rate zexpot+1 is obtained by the definition for the ex-post
optimal threshold ω̄t+1, the realized return on capital, the ex-post optimal leverage choice
and the ex-post optimal bankruptcy threshold:
ẑexpoit+1 = ˆ̄ω
expo
it+1 + R̂
k
it+1 −
1
lev − 1
ˆlev
expo
it .
zexpot+1 is the interest payment the small group of entrepreneurs would face if they chose the
ex-post optimal leverage level.
A.8 Welfare loss computation
We measure the welfare loss λ of fluctuations induced by confidence in percentage terms of
steady state consumption:
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
log(C(1− λ))− H
1+ν
1 + ν
]
=
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
log(C̃t)−
H̃1+νt
1 + ν
]
,
λ = 1− exp
(
(1− β)
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
log(C̃t)− log(C)−
(
H̃1+νt
1 + ν
− H
1+ν
1 + ν
)])
26Note that in steady state ω̄expo = ω̄.
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C̃t and H̃t denote consumption and employment in an economy driven by confidence shocks,
whereas C and H denote consumption and employment in the steady state.
We compute the average welfare loss of confidence driven fluctuations as follows. We
generate 1000 confidence shock time series of the length of 500 years. For each time series,
we use our log-linearized decision rules to compute a series of consumption and hours and
compute λ:
λ = 1− exp
(
(1− β)
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
ˆ̃ct −
(
exp((1 + ν)(
ˆ̃
ht + log(H))
1 + ν
− exp((1 + ν) log(H))
1 + ν
)])
The solution approach does not allow for a higher-order approximation of the model solution.
The welfare loss of confidence driven fluctuations is then computed by taking the average
over the 1000 values of λ.
A.9 Great Recession counterfactual
The risk shock σω,t is modelled as the time-varying standard deviation of the idiosyncratic
productivity shock ω to the entrepreneur’s raw capital. We assume the logarithm of σω,t
follows an AR(1) process with mean log(σ̄ω):
log(σω,t) = ρs log(σω,t−1) + (1− ρs) log(σ̄ω) + εs,t, εs,t ∼ N (0, σ2s).
As all other fundamental shocks, σω,t hits the economy in the beginning of the first-stage
of a period. The persistence of the risk shock is set to ρs = 0.97, based on the estimates
of CMR. All other model parameters, but the standard deviations of the shock, remain
the same as in our baseline model. To calibrate the standard deviations of all shocks, we
follow the same calibration procedure as outlined in Section 4.1. This procedure leads us to
σa = 0.70, σs = 0.03, σξ = 10.08.
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